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In the West, limited government capacity to solve environmental problems has triggered 
the rise of a variety of “nonstate actors” to supplement government efforts or provide 
alternative mechanisms for addressing environmental issues. How does this development 
- along with our efforts to understand it - map onto environmental governance processes in 
China? China’s efforts to address environmental issues reflect institutionalized governance 
processes that differ from parallel western processes in ways that have major consequences 
for domestic environmental governance practices and the governance of China “going 
abroad.” China’s governance processes blur the distinction between the state and other 
actors; the "shadow of the state" is a major factor in all efforts to address environmental 
issues. The space occupied by nonstate actors in western systems is occupied by shiye 
danwei (“public service units”), she hui tuanti (“social associations”) and e-platforms, all 
of which have close links to the state. Meanwhile, international NGOs and multinational 
corporations are also significant players in China. As a result, the mechanisms of influence 
that produce effects in China differ in important ways from mechanisms familiar from the 
western experience. This conclusion has far-reaching implications for those seeking to 
address global environmental concerns, given the importance of China’s growing economy 
and burgeoning network of trade relationships.  
 
Keywords: Nonstate actors, environmental governance, she hui tuanti (“social group”), shi 





In the west, limited government capacity to make and enforce environmental standards 
has led to increased efforts of “nonstate actors” to supplement or provide alternatives to 
governmental actions to address environmental problems. Such actors include both 
environmental nongovernmental or nonprofit organizations (ENGOs) and for-profit 
corporations that, individually or in association, take an interest in the systematic 
modification of enterprise behavior to embrace sustainability. In many cases, the focus is 
on global supply chains, and nonstate actors include groups that reach across state borders.  
 
In this article, we ask how developing western literature on nonstate actors in 
environmental governance applies to the China experience. Are key findings and 
frameworks generalizable from western systems to the setting evolving in China during the 
nearly four decades since People’s Republic of China (PRC) reform and opening up began? 
Do we need to make significant adjustments to explain China developments? Equally 
important, will lessons from the Chinese experience broaden and deepen understanding of 
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the roles nonstate actors play in environmental protection? We aim both to advance 
understanding of environmental governance and to contribute to the thinking of those 
engaged in applied efforts to address environmental problems (Young et al. 2015).1  
 
There is growing literature on domestic and cross-border activities of nonstate actors 
addressing environmental issues in western democracies and many developing countries 
(Bartley et al, 2015; Auld, 2014; Buthe and Mattli, 2011; Cashore et al, 2004). This 
literature encompasses two broad streams, one dealing with the role of ENGOs and 
business associations in creating and implementing standards, certification schemes, and 
codes of conduct, and the other dealing with the role of corporations and focusing on what 
is often called corporate social responsibility or CSR (Baron, 2009; Vogel, 2007). However, 
there is little literature on whether and how global nonstate actor networks operate in or 
with China or on the landscape of a China native counterpart community. 
 
For the most part, western literature does not deal with the experience of China, despite 
the fact that China accounts for ~18% of the Earth’s human population, has the world’s 
second largest economy, and is central to a burgeoning network of global trade 
relationships. Equally important, China has a distinctive system of governance with central 
planning remaining a key mechanism for setting priorities and allocating society’s 
resources.  
 
Our central argument is that the current western vernacular is not robust enough to 
capture the realities of what is happening in China, where government is the central player 
in all realms and western distinctions among public sector, private sector, and civil society 
are not clearly applicable. China has its own institutionalized governance processes (Young 
et al. 2015). Dealing with environmental protection in this setting involves a set of practices 
that cannot be understood through a lens that features a sharp distinction between the state 
and nonstate actors. Any effort to shed light on roles that various types of actors play in 
addressing issues of environmental protection in China must take differences between 
Chinese institutionalized governance processes and familiar western processes as a point 
of departure.  
 
While the term nonstate actor is standard in international relations discourse, 
many practitioners and scholars also use it in relation to domestic governance (e.g., 
WHO, 2006; Canuto, 2012; Steer, 2015). We hope that our work contributes to the 
development of an improved vocabulary for comparative analysis.2 For the moment, 
however, we retain the term nonstate actor because alternatives like NGO or CSO 
(civil society organization) and more culturally specific terms like Quango do not 
encompass core actors in our story, particularly “private” profitmaking enterprises 
                                                        
1 This article reflects discussion during a two day 2016 workshop at Fudan University that brought 
together representatives of nonstate actors and environmental studies, law, public policy/public 
management scholars from China, US, EU, Brazil, and Australia. 
 
2  While the term nonstate actor is standard in international relations discourse, many 
practitioners and scholars also use it in relation to domestic governance (e.g., WHO, 2006; 
Canuto, 2012; Steer, 2015). 
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and other actors (notably shiye danwei) that have received little attention in the west 
and may have no western analogs.  
 
  The line separating “state” and “nonstate” is both blurry and subject to change, with 
variations from society to society.  To a Chinese audience, for example, “nonstate” may 
seem hard to apply to a U.S. , Brazilian, Canadian or European “NGO” that relies heavily 
on government funds.  Similarly, a Chinese analyst might question whether a company like 
Lockheed Martin that relies almost entirely on government contracts is a private enterprise 
(Guttman, 2000). Although we use the English term nonstate actor in this article, we 
emphasize that western usage does not map onto the Chinese experience precisely. 
 
We proceed in several steps. Following an initial account of important differences 
between western systems and contemporary China realities, we ask what Chinese actors 
are important to our story (Guttman, 2015)?  
 
Having identified the relevant actors, we examine their main streams of activities, with 
agendas emanating from the state, from organizations independent of enterprises, and from 
enterprises themselves, either individually or through associations. This sets the stage for 
an analysis of principal mechanisms used to influence the behavior of major players. An 
initial exploration of the effectiveness of nonstate actor efforts to influence environmental 
governance in China together with a preliminary account of key determinants of success 
follows.  
 
The final section assesses insights from the Chinese experience that may enrich analysis 
of nonstate actor roles in environmental governance in other systems. We include 
reflections on next steps in analysis of the role of nonstate actors in environmental 
governance. 
2.  Setting the stage: the landscape of environmental governance in China 
We begin with a brief characterization of China’s environmental governance 
landscape. Though China’s remarkable economic development features private 
enterprises and markets, China, in Constitutional terms is a “socialist” system, and 
one in which the Communist Party of China (CPC), as formalized by March, 2018 
Constitutional amendment, plays the key role in directing the economy and related 
environmental policies. Despite marketizing trends, state planning - from the central Five 
Year Plan (FYP) to myriad further central and local plans - continues to set core goals for 
society and resource allocation. The concept of ecological civilization (shengtai wenming), 
introduced at the 2007 17th Party Congress, is accompanied by the greening of the Five 
Year Plan (Koleski 2017, Young et al. 2015, Li, nd., 13th Five Year Plan for Economic and 
Social Development of the People’s Republic of China 2016).  
 
Pollution, treated as an “externality” in western analyses of environmental governance, 
is internalized in China’s planning process. Core enterprises, including energy companies 
that are key sources of pollution, are state-owned enterprises or SOEs (guoyou qiye). The 
government also owns much land and resources at issue in sustainability.  
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China’s governments have been civilizational leaders in standard setting. Despite its 
short reign, the Qin dynasty (221-206 BCE) is considered seminal in part because of its 
standardization of weights, measures, coins, written script language, and administrative 
structures (Lewis, 2007). Government agencies for standard setting and supervision 
emerged as enterprises and markets developed during the “opening up and reform period.” 
These included, at the ministerial level, the General Administration of Quality Supervision, 
Inspection & Quarantine (AQSIQ) and, under AQSIQ, the Standards Administration of the 
People’s Republic of China (SAC) and the Certification and Accreditation Administration 
of the People’s Republic of China (CNCA). 3  Standards in China fall into multiple 
categories: national standards, industry standards, local or regional standards, group 
standards, and enterprise standards for individual companies. National standards can be 
either mandatory (guojia biaozhun or “GB”) or voluntary (ITA website). 
 
Beginning with “opening up and reform,” China’s party and government system 
spawned numerous private enterprises and hundreds of thousands of organizations 
conventionally referred to by the government (in English) as “NGOs” or “social 
organizations” (China Daily 2012). Their employees are not “civil servants” (as provided 
for by the billeting or bianzhi system for civil service positions), and the organizations lack 
formal status of “government” organizations. But they retain strong formal and informal 
ties to government. 
 
In this context, standard setting has devolved significantly to actors that often have no 
clear western analog. As enterprises and universities developed, the 1988 Standardization 
Law of the People’s Republic of China provided (Article 12) that “[t]he roles of trade 
associations, scientific research institutions and academic organizations shall be brought 
into play in the formulation of standards.” As a 2016 paper by experts affiliated with 
Tsinghua University and the China National Institute of Standardization (both “shiye 
danwei”) put it: “[A]fter the [1980’s] reform and opening up, all levels of government have 
promoted the establishment of many standardization associations […]. These associations 
are generally not really independent social organizations and have a very close relation 
with the government” (Ping and Zhang 2016).  
 
China standard setting reform continues to draw on government “delegation” to such 
institutions. This includes group or community standards developed by business 
associations, increasing in number and import (National Group Standard Information 
Platform 2016). Article 6 of the Draft Amendment to the National Standardization Law 
provides that “[t]he government encourages enterprises, social groups, and educational and 
research organizations to conduct or participate in the standardization work” (Draft 
Amendment to Standardization Law). In addition, reforms call for cooperation with 
“foreign” standard setting institutions, toward development of standards with Chinese 
characteristics (Circular of the State Council 2015).  
 
                                                        
3  We note China government reorganization announced in March 2018 may alter some titles 
and relationships (NPC Observer, 2018). 
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For our purposes, the essential point is that China’s government plays a key role in all 
sectors of society, a fact making it misleading to draw sharp distinctions among public 
sector, private sector, and civil society. Though we employ the English expression nonstate 
actor, we recognize such actors are not entirely autonomous in China in the sense of being 
free to adopt strategies without reference to government preferences. 
  
3. Identifying the players: the evolving community of China’s environmental nonstate 
actors 
 
The landscape of environmental nonstate actors in China encompasses many distinct 
types of organizations.  
 
3.1  “NGOs” - Domestic and Foreign  
 
China has many entities referred to in English (e.g. in the China Daily) as “NGOs” 
(China Daily 2012). These include organizations created by Chinese citizens and China 
operations of “foreign NGOs.”  
 
3.1.1 Domestic NGOs 
 
The Ministry of Civil Affairs (MCA) reports, at year-end 2016, 695,000 registered 
social organizations in China (China Development brief, 2017; China social 
organization website). The vast bulk are  minban feiqiye danwei (“nonprofit 
enterprises”) and shehui tuanti” (social groups including, as relevant here, business 
or professional associations).  They also include she hui fu wu ji gou” (“social service 
organizations”) under the new Charity Law and “ jijinhui” (foundations). 
 
In China, the appellation “NGO” is often used for these social organizations, although 
their relation to government is far from independent. The social organization registration 
and supervision system (SORSS) requires, as a precondition for registration, that a social 
organization must have a business supervisory agency (yewu zhuguan danwei), usually a 
party or governmental agency (Simon, 2013: Jing, 2015; Furst, 2016).  
 
Of the near 700,000 registered “NGOs,” about 7000 are said to be “environmental 
NGOs.” Most are small, with limited staff and resources. Only a few (e.g. Friends of Nature 
and All China Environmental Federation) have national reach. The Institute of Public and 
Environmental Affairs (IPE), a minban feiqiye established by Ma Jun in 2006, is a leading 
example of a registered “NGO” focused on promoting environmental standards (IPE 
website). In 2014, China amended its environmental law to provide (at Article 58) that 
qualified environmental NGOs (e.g. by charter mission, years of operation and good 
standing) can represent the public interest in court (Environmental Protection Law; 
Supreme Court Judicial Interpretation).  
 
3.1.2 “Foreign” NGOs  
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Since WWF’s early 1980s entry, many ENGOs chartered abroad have come to China. 
In addition to WWF, as relevant to our story of nonstate actor environmental protection 
efforts, these include the Forest Stewardship Council, ISEAL Alliance, the Rainforest 
Alliance, Alliance for Water Stewardship, Marine Stewardship Council, Better Cotton 
Initiative, Roundtable for Sustainable Palm Oil, and Programme for the Endorsement of 
Forest Certification. Relevant to our story as well are organizations like Greenpeace and 
Amnesty International, whose investigatory work provides entrée for other nonstate actor 
efforts.  
 
Historically, however, few “foreign” NGOs have been granted legal status under China’s 
NGO law. Accordingly, they have sought other status, including registration as business 
enterprises (gongsi) (Simon, 2013). Therefore, the 2016 Law of the People’s Republic of 
China on Administration of Activities of Overseas Nongovernmental Organizations 
discussed below is fundamentally altering the “foreign” NGO presence in China.  
 
3.2 Enterprises: CSR  
 
CSR is another term in the global vernacular with varying definitions even within 
countries. In one common definition, the concept refers to activities beyond those required 
by corporate law or government regulations (Baron 1999; Vogel 2007). In China, following 
government direction, CSR is now a mainstream corporate activity, particularly among 
state-owned and publically traded enterprises with core environmental challenges (e.g. 
China’s state-owned oil companies) (CNOOC, Sinopec CSR websites). In export industries, 
such as apparel and electronics, multinational supply chain codes as we will discuss, may 
become reinforcements of CSR.  
 
In 2008, the State Council issued CSR guidelines for SOEs (SASAC). The Shanghai, 
Shenzhen, and Hong Kong stock exchanges have issued guidelines and requirements on 
CSR reporting (including environment) (BSD), and the Standardization Administration 
(SAC) issued guidelines for voluntary “social responsibility reporting” (Chinese standards 
net). Of particular note, the Environmental, Social and Governance Guidelines issued by 
the Hong Kong exchange appear to be having impact on smaller Hong Kong registered 
mainland enterprises that are not SOEs governed by SASAC guidelines (Fudan workshop 
discussion; Hong Kong ESG guidelines). 
  
3.3 Business Associations  
 
PRC “opening up and market reform” brought the development of business associations 
with distinct legal personalities (Hsueh, R., 2011). Typically registered legally as shehui 
tuanti (social groups), but also referred to as hangye xiehui (business/industrial associations) 
or (hangye zuzhi) (business/industrial organizations), they are playing an increasing role in 
the promotion of “social responsibility” including environmental standard setting.   
 
Social groups include standard implementers as well as standard setters. The China 
Certification and Accreditation Association (CCAA) was established in 2005 under 
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AQSIQ (CNCA website). Its work includes implementing national certification and 
accreditation policies (Article 6)(Id.). 
 
The difficulty of fitting these institutions into the nonstate actor frame is reflected in a 
2016 English language presentation by an association’s staff characterizing them as “public 
institutions” (Fudan workshop Ppt): 
 
“CNTAC [textile industry association] was transformed from the former Ministry 
of the Textile Industry, and is now a public institution of the State-owned Assets 
Supervision and Administration Commission of the State Council; CCCMC 
[mining] is a public institution of the Ministry of Commerce; CESA [electronics] 
is a public institution of MIIT; the Ministry of Commerce and MIIT are the 
authorities of CHINCA [contractors] and CACE [communications] respectively.” 
 
3.4 Shiye danwei (“public service units”) 
 
Shiye danwei constitute a further relevant organization type that, from a foreign 
perspective, may look like either a “governmental” or “nongovernmental” body but is not 
properly understood as either. Shiye danwei (often translated as “public service unit”) 
include China’s universities, hospitals, research institutes (e.g., the China Academy of 
Sciences), and organizations, like the China Academy of Environmental Planning, that 
serve as staff for government agencies. Staff members are not “civil servants” 
(gongwuyuan). However, given the role of government in their direction (e.g., sponsorship, 
selection of leadership, assignments), they are not fully nonstate actors (Guttman, Song, Li 
2013; Tang and Lo 2009). In recent years, shiye danwei have experienced a general reform 
or reclassification. On review of their functions, the status of some has been/is being 
changed to governmental agency, enterprise, or social organization (Id.). 
 
As examples relevant to our story, the China National Institutes of Standardization is a 
shiye danwei research institution under the AQSIQ. Its English language website describes 
it as a “public interest institution at national level” (CNIS website). The Chinese Academy 
of Sciences has issued CSR reporting guidelines (Global Reporting Initiative 2014) and the 
Chinese Academy of Forestry (a shiye danwei) plays a continuing role in developing 
China’s forest certification standards. The China National Accreditation Service for 
Conformity Assessment (CNAS) (a shiye danwei) is responsible for accreditation of 
certification, laboratory and inspection bodies, established under the Certification and 
Accreditation Administration of the People’s Republic of China (CNCA) (CNAS website).  
 
3.5  Emerging E-platforms  
 
In their explosive growth, China’s major web platforms - Ali Bbaba, Baidu, Tencent - 
have become virtual storehouses for services and products within China and globally. A 
core question is how they may emerge as sources for environmental standards for goods 
and services. While it is premature to answer this question here, the potential role for 




4.  Making a difference: streams of activities and mechanisms of influence 
  
Observers have chronicled a range of strategies nonstate actors pursuing environmental 
protection have developed, with variations among them. To understand use of these 
strategies in China, we speak of “streams of activities” and “mechanisms of influence.”   
 
Regarding streams of activities, we ask whether the stream source is: (1) government 
rules with nonstate actors aiding in implementation; (2) organizations operating outside the 
government and independent of enterprises, or (3) enterprises acting individually or 
through associations to set and implement standards going beyond those established by the 
state.  
 
By mechanisms of influence, we refer to tools or levers nonstate actors employ to alter 
conduct and the theories of change they reflect. Why should enterprises pay attention to 
regulators who are not government and lack government penal power? If they do pay 
attention, why is it likely to be more than for public relations purposes (“greenwashing”)?  
  
4.1 Streams of activities and institutional arrangements that illustrate their workings 
in China 
 
Stream One: Governments adopt regulatory measures and related standards; nonstate 
actors play prominent roles in administering or implementing them, ensuring compliance, 
or monitoring progress toward achieving goals.   
 
The Institute of Public and Environmental Affairs (IPE), founded by Ma Jun, a China 
environmental pioneer, draws on government required information disclosure and develops 
its own indices and rankings to stimulate compliance with disclosure requirements.  
 
Ma Jun’s approach reflects time spent in the U.S. and study of American ENGOs’ use 
of government mandated information disclosure, such as the Toxic Release Inventory. In 
cooperation with the China program of the U.S. Natural Resources Defense Council, IPE 
developed and operates an annual survey of China local government information disclosure 
(the pollution information transparency index or PITI). 
 
In 2011, Ma Jun brought global attention to the poisoning of 137 Apple supply chain 
workers polishing products with N Hexane (Barboza 2011). The PITI index is now 
accompanied by a corporate information transparency index (CITI), which ranks 
multinational brands on information disclosure, measuring the “greening of the supply 
chain” (IPE website).  
 
In addition to IPE, ENGOs seeking to supplement governmental enforcement include 
those authorized by 2014 China environmental law amendments to go to court to represent 
the public interest. While hundreds of NGOs may technically qualify, the number of NGOs 
serving as plaintiffs is small. In 2015, ~50 lawsuits were brought primarily by Beijing-
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based Friends of Nature and the Center for Biodiversity Conservation and Green 
Development Foundation (Li 2016).  
 
Further, government environmental enforcement is supplemented by an array of 
accreditation and inspection institutions and shiye danwei that serve government in day-to-
day monitoring and inspection. 
 
Stream two: NGOs take initiatives in developing and implementing standards, 
introducing certification procedures, identifying best practices, or devising codes of 
conduct, sometimes in partnership with businesses or governments.   
 
Here, primary actors appear to be foreign nonstate actors. Through training, consultation 
or other forms of cooperation, they assist China counterparts and promote their own 
standards.  
 
The ISEAL Alliance and its members exemplify the first approach (ISEAL website). 
China business associations, such as CCCMC (outbound mining guidance), use ISEAL’s 
work as a reference in developing their own standards (CCCMC website).  
 
The second approach is illustrated by the evolution of China forestry standards in a 
process that might be called a nesting of global nonstate actor standards into the China 
community. 
 
The Forest Stewardship Council (FSC), founded in 1993, is a Germany based 
international multistakeholder membership NGO (FSC website). It develops standards and 
provides for voluntary forest management and chain of custody certification. FSC issued 
its first chain of custody certificate in China in 1999. In 2007, WWF set up an FSC China 
working group with representatives from government, universities, enterprises and NGOs. 
(WWF website: FSC) 
 
The China Forestry Certification Council (PEFC), a business association, also has 
developed standards. The Council, established in 2010, is a member of the Program for 
Endorsement of Forest Certification Schemes, another global forestry nonstate regulator. 
In 2014, the Council’s China Forest Certification Scheme (CFCS) was endorsed by PEFC 
and embraced by the China government (PEFC 2014; 2015). 
 
Stream Three: Enterprises take the lead in developing and implementing the rules. This 
can involve enterprises acting individually in the form of CSR, trade associations or 
alliances to promote good practices, or enterprises (including banks and investment 
consortia) joining forces in support of codes of conduct (e.g. the Equator Principles). Often, 
the focus is greening supply chains.  
 
Stream Three initiatives include those with global connections and those domestically 
rooted. In addition, Chinese business associations play prominent roles in developing 
social responsibility, including environmental guidelines and standards, doing so in 
consultation or cooperation with global nonstate networks. 
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In 2005, the China National Textile and Apparel Council (CNTAC) established an office 
of social responsibility. CNTAC launched a voluntary Corporate Sustainability Compact 
9000 for Textile and Apparel Industry (CSC9000T). CNTAC terms the standard “China’s 
first real attempt to address the concerns of western-based retailers and brands about how 
their products were being produced” and the beginning of China efforts to become a “seller” 
of sustainability standards to the globe (Fudan workshop Ppt). 
 
Other associations producing social responsibility documents include the China 
International Contractors Association (CHINCA) (CHINCA website) and the China 
Chamber of Commerce of Metals, Minerals & Chemicals Importers & Exporters 
(CCCMC) (CCCMC website).  
 
China business associations are developing standards for China enterprises going abroad. 
For example, CCCMC, in cooperation with OECD, developed the “Chinese due diligence 
guidelines for responsible mineral supply in China” (CCCMC website). The aim, according 
to the Project brief, is (OECD website):  
 
“for Chinese mining companies undertaking outbound mining investment, 
cooperation and trade to strictly ‘observe the UN Guiding Principles on Business 
and Human Rights during the entire life-cycle of the mining project’ and to 
strengthen ‘responsibility throughout the extractive industries value chain.’”  
 
The 2014 CCCMC Chinese Guidelines for Social Responsibility in Outbound Mining 
Investment (CCCMC website) call on members to “conduct risk-based supply chain due 
diligence in order to prevent engagement with materials that may have funded or fuelled 
conflict.” They address human rights related risks (Type 1) and “risks associated with 
serious misconduct in environmental, social and ethical issues” (Type 2). Companies are 
to develop codes to meet guidelines requirements, with provisions for third party audit and 
certification. 
 
Following Amnesty International’s reporting on exploitation of child labor in Congo 
cobalt mining, CCCMC has been credited with a lead role in developing “[T]he 
Responsible Cobalt Initiative,” working with OECD and joined by Apple, Samsung and 
other multinational electronics suppliers (Whoriskey and Frankel 2016). 
 
Foreign corporate rooted initiatives also are active in China. Walmart led in creating The 
Sustainability Consortium (TSC) to “green the supply chain.” TSC members and partners 
include manufacturers, retailers, suppliers, service providers, NGOs, civil society 
organizations, governmental agencies and academics. TSC “convenes these diverse 
stakeholders to work collaboratively to build science-based decision tools that address 
sustainability issues that are materially important throughout a product supply chain and 
lifecycle.” In entering China, TSC’s U.S. university partners entered into cooperation with 
Nanjing University's School of the Environment. 
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Finally, environment is a prominent China CSR focus. A 2013 Swedish government 
survey found environment (47%) ranked second only to economic issues (62%) among 
CSR priorities (CSR-Asia website). For example, Sinopec, the largest China state-owned 
oil company, reports (Sinopec website): 
 
In 2011, we signed responsibility documents of major pollutants discharge 
reduction target with the government and delegated the target among our 
subsidiaries. We also developed the 12th Five-Year Plan for Sinopec environmental 
protection work, which deploys key environment-related tasks in the future. 
 
4.2  Mechanisms of influence or levers nonstate actors use to induce enterprises to 
contribute to environmental protection and sustainability.  
 
Nonstate actors lack the authority and power of states to compel change in conduct. The 
global repertoire available to nonstate actors to affect these pressure points includes core 
mechanisms of influence used in China.  
 
First, in China today, the “shadow of the state” occupies a prime role. This is both by 
virtue of the role of government in affecting enterprise conduct and in relation to NGOs 
and associations whose licenses to operate are government dependent.  
 
 For example, Syntao, a China CSR advisory firm whose clients include Chinese and 
foreign multinationals (e.g. Volkswagen and Coca Cola) advises that in China today 
(Fudan workshop Ppt):  
 
--Government has dominant influence 
--Less influence from Investors 
--Less influence from Consumers 
--NGOs are limited in capacity and resources 
--Lack of Trust 
 
   Similarly, the 2013 report by CSR/Asia and the Swedish Embassy summarizes: “A 
majority of the respondents view the government as the key driver of CSR development in 
the country” (CSR-Asia website). 
 
As exemplified by IPE’s indices, nonstate strategies that combine the shadow of the state 
and “carrots” constitute a useful approach. The PITI index focuses on making local/local 
government competition transparent. In “borrowing” government authority, IPE collects 
and reposts information published by government with productive effects on localities and 
enterprises. IPE’s work includes inquiries to enterprises to see if they have addressed 
unlawful conduct.  
 
Second, crisis is a driver in generating and focusing attention motivating government 
and thereby enterprises to act.    
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China leaders’ attention to environment is stimulated by public crises. Examples include 
the 2005 Songhua river water spill, followed by elevation of the environmental agency to 
ministry status, and 2008 baby milk powder poisoning, leading to food safety law. Rising 
public open information-based awareness of PM 2.5 air pollution and early 2013 Beijing 
“airpocalypse” led to a September 2013 air pollution “action plan” (Young et al. 2015).  
 
Crises similarly provide opportunities for nonstate regulation. As noted above, a report 
on child labor in cobalt mining led to the China mining association’s entrance into the issue, 
and IPE’s success in focusing on supply chains followed on IPE’s work in bringing global 
attention to Apple supply chain worker poisoning. As a Fudan workshop nonstate actor 
participant put it, Greenpeace investigations provide openings for organizations that do not 
play such an adversarial role (Fudan workshop discussion). 
 
Third, there is provision of resources essential to enterprise activity, 
 
China’s government experiments with resource incentives for green performance. These 
include “green credit” (favorable bank treatment for environmental performance) (Zhang 
et al. 2011) and green government procurement (Qiao and Wang 2011). Currently, “green 
finance” is a government focus (UNEP/PSI website), and there is study of “sustainable 
insurance” (Bacani 2015). 
 
    From the vantage of the first stream, IPE engages major China realtors who commit to 
buy from suppliers who comply with environmental laws, as shown by government data. 
From the vantage of multinational purchasers (the third stream), The Sustainability 
Consortium’s “toolkits” provide key performance indicators (KPIs) for best practices, 
products and services. In principle, suppliers and multinational purchasers will use toolkits 
and KPIs in selecting suppliers (The Sustainability Consortium website). 
 
Fourth, there is the provision of expertise that companies value.  
 
Global second stream nonstate actors, such as ISEAL Alliance and its members, provide 
expert services to China business associations, government agencies, and NGOs in 
developing standards. They also provide expertise directly to enterprises. 
 
For example, the Better Cotton Initiative (BCI) works with China farmers in “learning 
groups” that are then organized into “producing units.” The 2014 Harvest Report indicates 
that BCI’s Implementing Partners worked with 7,028 farmers organized into 10 Producer 
Units and 9 large farms; 6,458 China farmers earned a Better Cotton license (Better Cotton 
Initiative 2014). 
 
The Alliance for Water Stewardship (AWS) acts as an expertise purveyor helping 
identify available technologies and practices. AWS works across industries (e.g. fashion 
and micro-electronics) providing understanding of the role of water in the supply chain and 
supply chain “risks and resilience.” AWS’ working hypothesis is that adoption of best 
technologies or practices by a critical mass of leaders will provide a “tipping point” for an 
industry sector (AWS Fudan workshop presentation). 
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Fifth, there is the push and pull of going abroad. 
 
In addition to roles in multinational supply chains, Chinese enterprises have growing 
investments and interests in doing business abroad. As in the CCCMC mining standards 
and Forestry association cooperation with FSC and PEFC, companies are interested in 
being perceived as good global citizens. Global Environmental Institute is a China 
domestic NGO whose project focus includes Myanmar, Sri Lanka, Pakistan and 
Africa. Countries (GEI Website). This China going abroad focus is likely to become 
more important as China's leaders pursue the Belt and Road Initiative (Economist 
Intelligence Unit 2017). 
 
Sixth, there is what might be called cross border cultural arbitrage.  
 
Cultural differences can provide both constraints and synergies for nonstate actor efforts 
to work across borders.   
 
For example, AWS has a substantial presence in Australia, where green awareness 
surrounds fashion purchases. AWS’s Australian Fashion Brand Initiative encompasses 
supply chain links from cotton production to processing to retail sales. The Australian focus 
provides leverage with China portions of fashion supply chains. In China, AWS works with 
WWF in cooperation with H & M (AFWS Fudan workshop presentation). 
 
5.  Evaluating performance: the effectiveness of nonstate actors  
 
How effective are efforts of nonstate actors in China and what are the determinants of 
success or failure in this realm? We explore two distinct questions: (i) do activities of 
specific nonstate actors succeed in solving problems or achieving goals motivating their 
efforts? (ii) do activities of nonstate actors taken together lead to improvements in China 
environmental governance? While it is too early to offer clearcut conclusions, we can begin 
to address these questions.  
 
5.1   Problem solving/goal fulfillment 
 
   Nonstate actors generally address specific problems. For example, they may seek to 
clean up polluted water bodies, reduce emissions of greenhouse gases, limit forest 
destruction, or improve the sustainability of industrial production processes. Assessing 
effectiveness requires evaluating progress toward fulfillment of these goals and 
determining the extent to which a given nonstate actor has played a role in progress. 
 
 The evaluation literature differentiates among outputs, outcomes, and impacts. Outputs 
are the first step; they may take the form of establishing standards, making decisions about 
awarding certificates, or setting up collaborative arrangements. In our context, the issuance 
of FSC certificates and the creation of the TSC are prominent examples. Outcomes have to 
do with measureable changes in behavior. Do corporations that hold FSC certificates make 
significant changes in their behavior or practices as a result of certification? Impacts bring 
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us to the most important stage in the causal chain. Are the problems that lead to action on 
the part of nonstate actors solved? Are there, for example, measurable improvements in 
water quality in targeted lakes and rivers? Can we demonstrate that nonstate actors play 
significant roles in achieving these results? 
 
 In the final analysis, we are interested in problem solving. Outputs and outcomes are 
important as steps to solve problems, not as ends in themselves. Nevertheless, it is typically 
easier to document outcomes and especially outputs in contrast to impacts. If the FSC 
issues a certificate, there is no question about the causal connection. Moving to outcomes 
already presents problems of demonstrating causality.  
 
 At this stage, we lack systematic evidence to make solid, data-based assessments of the 
roles that nonstate actors play in China environmental protection. This is a major challenge 
for research going forward. What we can do is provide some prominent illustrations from 
each stream of activities that will help concretize issues and offer initial insights regarding 
determinants of success. 
 
 For the first stream, the work of IPE and environmental NGOs representing the public 
interest in court illustrate successes and also, no less useful, highlight distances to go and 
steps to get there. IPE pioneers in using public information to push compliance with open 
information laws and rectification of illegal or harmful conduct they reveal. IPE’s annual 
PITI and CITI reports indicate year-on-year improvements or declines in locality and 
corporate information reporting. For example, IPE reports that the “top seven” cities score 
over 70 points on the PITI index, showing that advanced regions have improved 
information disclosure. This suggests IPE’s work has an effect. At the same time, however, 
IPE reports that scores in some regions remain low, with insufficient leverage of IPE 
reported data (Fudan workshop Presentation). 
 
 In 2015, the first year of ENGO “public interest” lawsuits under the 2014 amendment, 
about fifty lawsuits were initiated. Not surprisingly, there were varying degrees of success 
with regard to outcomes. In some cases, court orders for relief were granted. In others, 
relief was denied or courts did not accept the cases (Li 2016). Perhaps of greatest value, 
the initial efforts highlight challenges.  
 
While an estimated 300-700 NGOs may qualify to bring cases (UNDP 2015), most cases 
were brought by a small number of Beijing-based ENGOs: the China Biodiversity 
Conservation and Green Development Foundation (CBCGDF), Friends of Nature, and the 
All China Environment Federation. These organizations are critical, but compared with US 
and EU counterparts Chinese ENGOs have limited in-house legal and technical staff. The 
pressure on resources was highlighted by court orders, under review, that unsuccessful 
ENGO plaintiffs may be burdened with court costs (CBCGDF 2017, Zhang and Tang 
2017). Given limited resources and complexity and scale of China’s environmental 
problems, there is a premium on development of economies of scale. Going forward, the 
test is whether limited resources are devoted to highest priorities and whether success in 
one case in one locale is replicated elsewhere.  
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The efforts of ISEAL Alliance and its members illustrate stream two. First, ISEAL, by 
attestation of China trade associations and ISEAL members, plays a role as capacity builder 
and point of reference in development of China native standards. We can measure success 
by the numbers of Chinese organizations drawing on ISEAL’s work, and how it is 
embodied in their standards and implementation. Second, ISEAL Alliance’s effect arises 
from how ISEAL members adopt and effectuate Alliance principles in their China activities. 
Here, the story is a work in progress. 
 
ISEAL Alliance members publish evaluations according to Alliance standards. For 
example, the 2015 Sustainable Agricultural Network/Rainforest Alliance Impacts Report 
“Evaluating the Effects of the SAN/Rainforest Alliance Certification System on Farms, 
People, and the Environment” describes the monitoring and evaluation system and 
provides analyses by crop (bananas, coffee, tea, cocoa) and issue (livelihoods, water, 
conservation, biodiversity, smart agriculture and climate change). 
 
While reports provide data and success stories for work done outside China, however, 
China analyses are more limited. For example, the 2015 SAN/Rainforest Alliance Impacts 
Report shows that RA work is focused on tea, notes that tea originated in China, and that 
China, Kenya and India are prime producers today. But the report notes Kenya and India 
provide over 60% of Rainforest Alliance certified tea production, with China included 
among 3.5% in the “other country” category.  The report reviews evaluations of Kenya and 
India and spotlights a Kenya farmer. There is no similar in-depth China reporting. 
 
ISEAL Alliance members do report publically on a variety of China output measures. 
These include “softer” measures, such as Memoranda of understanding, and numbers of 
members, workshops, conferences, trainings or other awareness raising activities. For 
example, the Marine Stewardship council reports, in cooperation with the China Chain 
Store and Franchise Association, WWF and UNEP, on a “sustainable seafood week” 
(Marine Stewardship Council website).  
 
The measures also include indicators on standard application through certification. In 
2016, for example, FSC reports 4,000 chain-of-custody certificates in China, mostly for 
export and hectares of forest under certification (FSC website). Similarly, in 2016, the 
Rainforest Alliance reporting on China activities included: (i) 36 farms and forest 
management units under sustainable management, (ii) engaging 8 international buyers and 
hundreds of suppliers on responsible sourcing, and (iii) 15,000 individuals trained in 
sustainable land management (Rainforest Alliance, Fudan Workshop Ppt). 
 
In some cases, reports go further toward outcomes and impacts. For example, the Better 
Cotton Initiative (BCI) reports its China activities as a component of annual harvest reports. 
BCI reports continued year-on-year improvements. The 2014 data include numbers of 
farmers, areas under cultivation, and yields. The reports compare BCI farmers with 
“comparison” farmers on indicators including yield, synthetic and organic fertilizer use, 
pesticide and water use as well as profits (BCI, 2014). The 2014 Harvest Report documents 
that in all cases the BCI licensees did better than the comparison group.  
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Next are corporate-driven activities of stream three. Here, China offers three models: 
activities driven by multinationals such as The Sustainability Consortium (TSC), activities 
driven by Chinese business associations, and CSR. 
 
TSC’s 2016 Impact Report provides aggregate data (and “scores”) by product group and 
lifecycle stage, but does not contain country specific data (TSC website).  
 
Chinese companies increasingly provide CSR reports with “environment” or 
“sustainability” components. The Sino-Swedish China CSR website includes an 
environmental best practices page with summary case studies identifying practices and 
achievements (Sino-Sweden CSR, website). 
 
5.2   Systemic effects  
 
Whatever conclusions we reach about the success of individual nonstate actors in 
addressing particular environmental issues in China, we also ask whether their collective 
efforts are bringing about significant changes in China’s institutionalized environmental 
governance processes. Specific initiatives may fall short or fail altogether; many actors 
may end up with disappointing records on solutions to environmental problems. Even so, 
it is possible that the environmental movement spearheaded by an array of nonstate actors 
is playing a role in bringing about systemic changes in China’s environmental governance. 
 
It is helpful to distinguish two types of changes in thinking about these systemic effects: 
(i) changes in governmental structures and processes relevant to environmental issues and 
(ii) changes in the scope of opportunities for nonstate actors to play effective roles in 
environmental governance going forward.  
 
As in the case of problem solving, we cannot now produce data-based conclusions about 
these matters. That will require a sustained effort to collect and evaluate data over a period 
of time. But we can offer some initial observations about the systemic effects of the efforts 
of nonstate actors. 
It appears the “space” (or kongjian) for the nonstate activities is growing, but that 
the shadow of the state is expanding simultaneously. Numerous business associations 
(she hui tuanti) and “NGOs” have emerged in recent decades as distinct legal entities. 
Many shiye danwei, previously wholly dependent on state funding and service, now 
seek outside clients and revenue. Yet CSR, elsewhere undertaken following social 
pressure (or corporate self-initiative), is borne aloft in China by government 
direction. Similarly, while the 2014 law permits ENGOs to bring “public interest 
litigation,” a 2016 law confirms that the procuraturate, with far greater resources, 
will also pursue “environmental public interest” litigation with exclusive authority to 
bring suits against government (Library of Congress 2017). Actions taken in March 
2018 by the National People’s Congress, including formal inclusion of the CPC in the 
body of the State Constitution, continue to reaffirm the strength of the state.  
In this context of simultaneous nonstate actor and state (or party) strengthening, nonstate 
actor changes to watch include: (1) the developing role of trade associations in setting 
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standards both for domestic and “going abroad” enterprises and related development of 
CSR, (2) the role of IPE in developing “NGO driven” information-based regulation and 
environmental NGOs in public interest court cases, and (3) the iterative effect, if any, 
between China “outbound” and domestic standard setting and implementation.  
 
In comparison to western nonstate arrangements, structural developments in China 
feature core roles for public service units (shiye danwei) and business associations with 
close government connections, and limited roles for independent NGOs, whether measured 
in number or capacity of NGOs like IPE or NGOs making use of environmental law.  
 
Given the scale and complexity of China’s environmental challenges, the evolving 
structure has advantages and disadvantages. With a small central government civil service 
environmental workforce (500 or fewer civil servants in the Ministry of Environmental 
Protection, which through 2018 reform will be part of a new Ministry of Ecology and 
Environment), China’s business associations provide nationwide reach into Chinese 
enterprises supplementing the influence of government. In developing “voluntary” 
standards, the associations may provide testing grounds for “policy learning” toward 
mandatory standards.  
 
Nevertheless, public service units may generate routinized products, and business 
associations may provide lowest common denominator standards and oversight. In China, 
the question may be who will play the role NGOs (independent of business associations 
and enterprises) play elsewhere in providing stimulus and oversight?  
 
Interactions among elements of the evolving institutional structure may be key. China’s 
government mandates CSR and supports trade associations. How will CSR efforts of 
individual enterprises, presumably motivated at least in part by desire to portray themselves 
as leaders distinct from competitors, relate to associational standard setting? Will CSR 
leaders stimulate “races to the top” that NGOs lead elsewhere? As a corollary, in China’s 
remarkable development, local governments play key roles stimulating “races to the top” 
for GDP growth. In relation to performance indicators developed by IPE and potential 
NGO litigation, will local governments promote green races to the top? 
 
Finally, there is the role of “foreign NGOs” in supporting and stimulating development.  
Foreign NGOs have played multiple roles: (1) providing expertise, capacity building and 
financial support for Chinese counterparts; (2) providing cross-border leverage, as in the 
case of AWS’s capacity to bring Australian fashion interests to bear on China’s fashion 
supply chain; and (3) providing investigative reports and campaigns, as with Greenpeace 
and Amnesty International, providing space for foreign and domestic actors. How will 
implementation of the new Foreign NGO law affect these interactions?  
  
6.  Insights from the Chinese experience 
 
 What are the implications of China developments for our general understanding of 
nonstate actor roles in addressing environmental issues, especially in non-western settings? 
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We reemphasize initially our view that study of Chinese governance processes indicates 
that the concept of nonstate actor (or terms like NGO/CSO) is not robust enough to capture 
the reality of China’s emerging approach to environmental issues. This challenge of 
vocabulary is a matter of substance, not simply form. Government plays a different role in 
China today than it does in places like the US, EU, and Commonwealth countries, where 
the notion of nonstate actor evolved. While Chinese and western actors use similar tools 
(e.g. information disclosure, certification and accreditation), they operate differently in 
different systems.  
 
For scholars and practitioners alike, there is value to vocabulary that encompasses 
western nonstate actors and China counterparts. Further analysis should help researchers 
clarify the meaning(s) and value of the nonstate actor concept – not only in China but also 
in the West - and practitioners’ understanding of how cross-border arrangements need to 
be adjusted for application to local conditions.  
 
With appropriate vocabulary in hand, there are multiple opportunities for comparisons 
that may lead to scholarly insights and practical learning.  
 
First, the ultimate question is how effectiveness of governance processes developing 
in China, emphasizing government-related public service units and business 
associations, compares with western models, emphasizing more autonomous nonstate 
actors? Can the Chinese system provide a model for societies where NGOs, in the 
sense of entities more substantially independent from government and business, may 
not commonly play major roles? 
 
Next, how will Chinese processes play out given China’s dual role as one of the world’s 
largest economies and as a developing economy? Here, the relation between global and 
China trade association standards in China’s Belt and Road Initiative may provide a good 
point of entry for study. China and its enterprises have interests in striving to meet global 
standards and cooperate with global nonstate actor environmental standard setters. Thus, 
Chinese business associations work with ISEAL Alliance and its members. As exemplified 
by CCCMC, China’s minerals trade association works with the OECD and global suppliers 
on global responsibility guidelines and child labor in cobalt production.  
 
As a corollary, how will China address environmental standards in its role as leading 
consumer of multinational products as well as leading supply chain source? For example, 
China is not a significant palm oil producer but (with India) it is the world’s largest importer 
(IISD, 2014). In May 2013, the Roundtable for Sustainable Palm Oil (RSPO) signed an 
MOU with the China Chamber of Commerce for Import & Export of Foodstuffs, Native 
Produce & Animal By-Products (CFNA). At the 2016 third China palm oil summit, RSPO 
announced over 50 Chinese members, including Sinograin, a large state-owned enterprise, 
and the China National Cereals Oils and Foodstuff Corporation, China’s largest palm oil 
importer, with two palm facilities certified. (Kingdom of Netherlands website). As China’s 
leaders seek to use increased citizen purchasing power to transform the economy, it is a 
common complaint that citizens prefer foreign products or to purchase abroad. How will 
Chinese enterprises on the consuming end of global supply chains drive global standards? 
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Will evolving Chinese practices provide pushes or drags on global environmental 
protection? 
 
Third, is the relationship between environmental and other standards. Global nonstate 
actors often integrate environmental standards with labor, community, or human rights 
standards. The difficulties of efforts to link labor and environmental standard setting in 
China are often reported. The SAN/Rainforest Alliance Report, for example, focuses on 
worker conditions as an issue, using India as a case. China is not discussed.  But, as noted, 
CCCMC includes human rights and environment in its “going abroad” mineral industry 
guidelines. The implementation of such guidelines will be a subject for continued attention.  
 
Fourth, a core factor in nonstate actor efforts is opening the “corporate suite black box,” 
developing corporate suite awareness of and receptivity to environmental standards. Again, 
the Chinese system provides a basis for comparison. Elsewhere, inter-industry competition 
itself (including competition for consumers or financial sources) might be key. In China, 
the “shadow of the state” is key.  
 
Finally, the 2016 Foreign NGO law puts in doubt the continued role of “foreign NGOs” 
That have often played key roles in the development of the China community. From the 
“foreign NGO” perspective, there are risks associated with required reporting to the Public 
Security Ministry as well as to local (and foreign) staff and organizations regarding non-
adherence to rules. How will this affect advocacy NGOs, such as Greenpeace, that are 
keystone species in the nonstate actor landscape through research and reports that help 
catalyze opportunities for others?  
 
China’s environmental challenges are well known. Now, as China assumes a leading 
role in global environmental affairs, it is essential for scholars and practitioners to improve 
understanding of how the roles pioneered by western nonstate actors are being translated 
into a China context in which Chinese counterpart institutions are not only important 
domestically but also may assume global leadership roles.  
 
China is developing an alternative model of the role of nonstate actors in environmental 
governance. We have provided a frame for deepening understanding. This understanding 
should be of value to those engaged in global environmental governance. It should also 
prove useful to those from countries with well-developed nonstate sectors and those from 
developing countries with limited sectors both as a basis for comparison and as a source of 
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